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MEDICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL
IN SEA-BASED OPERATIONS
Captain Arthur M. Smith, MC, U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired), and
Captain Harold R. Bohman, MC, U.S. Navy

Medical support of the sick and wounded is a complicated, resource intensive, and vital aspect of any over-the-horizon operation. It needs to
be considered as a major subordinate command element just as the
Ground Combat Element, the Air Combat Element and the Combat
Service Support Element are.
A NAVY COMBAT SURGEON

D

uring World War II it took the Navy and Marine Corps years to confirm
and refine their prewar doctrine for amphibious attack. The labor began
with the first U.S. landings at Guadalcanal in August 1942; the resulting doctrine, organization, tactics, and techniques were subsequently used by the Army
in Europe. Early operations in both theaters highlighted the enormous difficulties associated with essential medical elements, and it was not until late 1944,
perhaps 1945, that these problems were adequately solved. During future major
expeditionary operations, will it take that long for a latent functionally effective
medical support system to evolve? Will medical support of the anticipated “sea
base” concept of operations, for example, be obligated to recapitulate the same
sad evolution of repetitive mistakes committed during prior conflicts over the
past century? It is imperative that those who bear responsibility for ensuring
that prompt and competent care is provided to the combat injured examine the
lessons emerging from historical precedent. Likewise, it would be reasonable to
consider the “revolutionary” concept of establishing a “medical command and
control element” in joint expeditionary operations, to obviate the often-validated
reality that those who choose to ignore the lessons of history are destined to repeat them.
In late 1992, the Navy formally shifted the focus of its planning from a Cold
War scenario for opposing Soviet naval forces in midocean toward a concept of

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/5

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Summer 2006.vp
Thursday, July 20, 2006 9:35:43 AM

2

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

54

Smith and Bohman: Medical Command and Control in Sea-Based Operations

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

countering land- and sea-based forces of potential regional aggressors in heavily
defended littorals. It moved the focus of Navy planning from a geographical environment where the force would operate primarily by itself to one of joint or
combined expeditionary/amphibious warfare from a sea base independent of
any land-based logistic lodgment. Today, in attempting to transform itself to
meet twenty-first-century needs, the Navy is emphasizing not only increased
readiness but also the ability to deploy naval forces quickly in response to crises
and conflicts around the world, notwithstanding homeland defense needs.
Since every option for transformation involves human assets, the potential
for sickness and injury must be factored into any operational equation. From a
medical perspective, a series of questions need to be answered, such as what specific forms of threat conjoined joint medical forces will likely face, and what role
Navy medical resources will play in enabling the rest of the joint/combined
force. What are the specific medical readiness goals for Navy medical assets
functioning in a joint environment, and what resources will be necessary to
reach them? Concurrently, what form of information architecture will be required? Who, in the final analysis, will be responsible for ensuring compliance
with goal expectations? Historical evidence of dysfunctional medical support
during the last century of conflict is profoundly discouraging; some medical
command and control mechanism in such joint/combined operations will be
necessary to ensure functional compliance with readiness and operational objectives. Let us look first at the operational future.
SEA BASING AND ITS PROPOSED MEDICAL SUPPORT
A series of innovative proposals followed the adoption of the sea-base concept.
New naval formations, such as the expeditionary strike group (amphibious ships
combined with surface combatants, attack submarines, and land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft), were implemented. It has also been proposed to launch expeditionary operations, complete with command, control, and support
infrastructures, directly from sea bases, to be formed, without necessarily establishing an intermediate land base, by a combination of amphibious and
sealift-type ships. (The sea-basing concept responds to a concern that fixed
overseas land bases in the future will become increasingly vulnerable to enemy
anti-access/area-denial weapons such as cruise missiles and theater range ballis1
tic missiles.) Computer technology will potentially tie together the personnel,
ships, aircraft, and installations of the sea base in a series of highly integrated local and wide-area networks capable of rapidly transmitting critical information,
under the rubric of “network-centric warfare.” An additional key program relating to sea basing is the notional Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or
MPF(F), ship, which would replace the Marine Corps’s current “black bottom”
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maritime prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command utilizing civilian mariner crews. The MPF(F) ships are to be specifically designed to
support the sea base while under way. Implementation of the sea-basing concept
will also possibly affect integration with future ships of the San Antonio (LPD
17) class of amphibious dock landing ships (which is replacing the old LPD
types and five older LSD-36 dock landing ships) as well as the LHA Replacement
(LHAR) program meant to retire the older Tarawa-class amphibious assault
ships. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the legacy T-AH hospital ships will be
replaced by a medical support system incorporating advanced-level medical facilities within the MPF(F)s and the expeditionary strike group.
Under current consideration is the operational expectation that the component parts of a sea base could “close”—arrive and begin operation—anywhere
in the world’s oceans within ten days of the executive order, by strategic air and
sea lift, to be followed overnight by the insertion of two battalions of an expeditionary brigade into an operational objective, one by air and another by sea, all
without any formal logistical support lodgment ashore. The goal is to complete
the entire “ship-to-objective maneuver” within thirty days. The return of the
force to the sea base (“retrograde reconstitution”) would take an additional
thirty days. The seagoing platforms of the sea base would comprise the ships of
an expeditionary strike group and a carrier-based strike group, united with
ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Force. The assemblage would sustain
ground, sea, and air operations with logistic support, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. It is envisioned that MPF(F)s themselves will meet all logistic requirements, including
berthing for over sixteen thousand personnel, as well as extensive medical modules with surgical-specialty capabilities (known as “echelon level three” care).
The medical modules would operate under “established hospital standards of
care,” utilizing appropriate nursing operating procedures. They would require
specialized and trained personnel, equipment, and quantities of supplies as necessary to match the operational exposure of combat personnel.
Under the sea-basing blueprint, a ground combat component inserted ashore
would have a minimal “footprint,” including a minimal medical support structure. It might be augmented by forward resuscitation and surgical (FRSS) units
or some functional equivalent, providing limited surgical capability beyond that
intrinsic to operational battalions. Even so, the limited depth of medical resources ashore will mandate prompt evacuation for the bulk of casualties—
generally by air, or when required by high-speed seagoing “connector” vessels—to
the ships of the sea base, primarily the ships of the expeditionary strike group
and MPF(F)s. If afloat resources are to be continuously available for new casualties, there will have to be an additional mechanism for evacuating initially
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/5
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treated casualties from the sea base to higher-level medical facilities, perhaps
thousands of miles away.
An important question is: Will it work?
HISTORICAL MEDICAL LESSONS FOR SEA BASING
Gallipoli
History has adjudged the British attempt to take the Dardanelles at Gallipoli to
be an amphibious fiasco, a failure owing in large degree to a lack of coordination
between attack and supporting elements, including the medical services. Among
the many medically related issues was the paucity of medical communications
and a poorly coordinated mechanism for transfer of casualties out to ships,
many of which were scarcely able to care for them, if at all. Many deaths ensued,
as did profound morbidities. The implication today for the likely result of poor
coordination of medical assets under the sea-base concept is obvious.
On 26 April 1915 Surgeon General Birrell, director of medical services for the
combined attack of the British and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
(ANZAC), requested that he and his deputy be allowed to join the general headquarters on board the battleship Queen Elizabeth, where the operational commander was, to supervise casualty evacuation. His request was refused, and he
was embarked instead on board Arcadian, a ship that possessed neither wireless
communications with the shore nor medical assets.
On 28 April Birrell was sent the message, “Lutzow [a transport being used as a
hospital transport ship] filling up rapidly. Request name of next hospital ship.
Where is the advanced depot of medical stores? Running short of supplies.” Another message read, “Wounded arriving rapidly—about 500. Probably require
another hospital ship.” To these messages there was no reply. The director of
medical services never received them. He was isolated—all signals from shore
were conveyed by wireless to Queen Elizabeth, where the general’s staff, which
2
was supposed to be coordinating the wounded evacuation, remained silent.
Casualties were transported to the beach on the backs of pack animals, as immortalized in ANZAC legend by the donkey “Murphy,” led by members of various irregular groups, such as expatriate European Jews (many driven by the
Ottomans out of Palestine to Egypt) organized by the British into transportation units known collectively as the “Zion Mule Corps” (see photo). The great
numbers of Commonwealth casualties practically stopped operational activity
on the beaches, and the devastation these drovers found at the water’s edge was
graphically described by Colonel John L. Beeston of the Royal Australian Medical Corps: “The whole beach is filled with wounded of all kinds and descriptions. It has quite unnerved me for a time. Some of the wounds are so ghastly,
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whole abdomens blown away and the
men still living. They are in such numbers
that it is difficult to get along, and there
3
is only one hospital ship in the bay.”
At least twenty-two converted “hospital ships,” twenty troop ships, and
other transports and merchant ships
had been set aside for the reception of
sick and wounded, but fear of Turkish
coastal artillery and German submarines prompted many of these vessels to
lie well offshore or in island ports some
distance away. From the beaches, casualties were towed seaward in small craft,
each carrying thirty patients, often in a
frantic search at night for a ship to accept them. Concurrently, as troopships
landed their complements on the
beaches or transports unloaded their
cargoes, they were rapidly filled with casualties. These “carriers” then moved to
the hospital ships or other vessels lying
offshore and likewise transferred the
casualties at sea, under occasionally
Private John “Simpson” Kirkpatrick and his donkey ”Murphy” evacuating casualty with
difficult, even dangerous, conditions.
leg wounds, Gallipoli
As described by one historian, “the
Australia War Memorial, J06392
wounded were evacuated in large horse
barges with sterns that could be let down for easy access; stretcher cases were
4
placed in big boxes and hoisted into ships with the aid of derricks.” Some were
5
swung on board by means of cargo nets dropped over the side. At a later stage,
minesweepers partially fitted for medical purposes were brought into use for
evacuating casualties, and the British Red Cross provided six motor launches
specially equipped to tow barges from the Gallipoli beaches (see photo). Ultimately, the large number of casualties at Gallipoli led to overcrowding, rendering many ships unsuitable as base hospitals. They became, in essence,
casualty-clearing stations, providing interim and often merely token treatment
of patients. The more serious cases were transferred to distant shore bases in
Egypt, Malta, and in some cases England itself.
Could the casualty-management breakdown witnessed at Gallipoli occur
again under the modern banner of sea basing? Will a proposed diminution of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/5
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Seaward evacuation of wounded by barge from Anzac Cove, Gallipoli
Australia War Memorial, C02679

medical assets (a “reduced medical footprint”) accompanying expeditionary
forces inserted from sea bases allow critical, life-threatening wounds to be attended to adequately? If all that is available ashore is a meager casualty-sorting
capability, and no efficient medical regulating network is established, will the results be any different from those experienced at Gallipoli?
The U.S. Invasion of Grenada
On 21 October 1983, with the designation of Commander Joint Task Force 120,
intensive operational planning was begun for Operation URGENT FURY. However, no combat support planners, including medical representatives, were invited to participate. Consequently, no estimate of logistical supportability was
completed prior to execution, and the required medical support system did not
develop. The short lead time and the absence of a designated task force surgeon
to coordinate medical services at the joint level left each service to plan medical
support within the scope of its own organic assets, with little or no joint coordination of such activities as casualty care management, whole blood procurement, and aeromedical evacuation. Erroneous assumptions may have been
made as well. For example, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division was
informed that two amphibious ships, USS Guam (LPH 9) and Trenton (LPD 14),
which were in the vicinity of Grenada, could provide significant medical and
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surgical support. The record is unclear, but this inaccurate information may
have been responsible for his ultimate decision to keep Army medical support to
6
a minimum.
The hostilities lasted ninety-six hours—123 casualties and eighteen deaths
were recorded—and brought combat wounded to both Guam and Trenton. No
significant or sustainable tactical medical asset was established within the combat zone during the hostilities, nor were there triage facilities ashore. Without
trained and experienced triage corpsmen or officers, casualties were not sent in
an orderly and logical flow to the proper receiving facilities. There were no established medical communication nets between the Army and Navy, let alone
with Trenton and Guam; Army helicopter pilots, unfamiliar with the Navy ships
and their silhouettes, brought casualties to whichever flight deck was most convenient. On several occasions the better-equipped Guam was overwhelmed with
both minor and lower-priority delayed casualties, while Trenton, which had no
surgical capability, laboratory, or blood bank, was sent critical casualties. In essence, medical assets were squandered and overutilized simultaneously.7
Beirut 1983
The U.S. Marine compound at the Beirut International Airport was bombed on
23 October 1983. The tragedy presented an opportunity to evaluate in detail the
American military medical system’s ability to react to such incidents or, by extension, to a larger conflict. Among the principal components tested that day
were medical command and control, casualty evacuation, medical regulating
procedures, capabilities of facilities, joint medical readiness mechanisms, and
the transition from routine peacetime to contingency operations.
A medical review group chaired by Rear Admiral James Zimble later evaluated the medical response to the bombing. Its 1984 report detailed serious deficiencies in medical readiness, attributing them in large part to a lack of medical
evacuation resources, shortages of equipment and personnel, and inadequate
joint planning for wartime or contingency requirements. The problems, it
found, were also the result of the low priority habitually assigned to medical
readiness in the planning, programming, and budgeting processes. As the report
declared, “Had the ratio of killed-outright-to-wounded been reversed, so that
over 200 casualties had required treatment, rather than fewer than 100, the medical system might well have failed.” The report recommended greater investment
in essential medical readiness resources and refinement in the command and
8
control over wartime support and operation of these resources.
During contingencies, smoothly running casualty support operations are
critical; a lack of joint planning obviously hampers the sharing of limited resources and creates confusion over responsibilities. As the Zimble Report noted
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in 1984—in a finding that raises problems that might be associated with future
sea basing—there was no comprehensive joint plan for the use of the medical assets that were already in place. The services’ contingency medical plans were
“stovepipe documents”—that is, their orientations were purely “vertical,” or
intraservice—and bore little relationship to each other. This was a direct result
of the tendency of the services’ medical components to support their respective
line units as if they were the only ones, and likewise a consequence of the lack of a
joint medical staff structure to arbitrate differences. There was no mechanism for
achieving efficiency through interservice sharing in peacetime, coordinating operations in wartime, or resolving inconsistencies among the components’ plans.9
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
An important element of the medical evacuation process, familiar in both military conflict and civilian mass-casualty disasters, is medical regulation, to which
we have already referred. “Medical regulators” manage the process by selecting
sources of care, matching patients’ medical requirements with the reported capabilities of treatment facilities. They must also ensure that the receiving medical facilities are not over- or underutilized—an essential matter when numerous
and dispersed facilities are involved. During the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91,
medical communications problems represented the greatest limitation in medical regulation, followed by failures of regulating systems to exercise effective
oversight of casualty movement. The result was that casualty evacuation was effectively compromised on many occasions.
Communications Problems
Troops on the battlefield could not communicate with ambulances. The radios
used by medical regulators had an operating range of only fifteen miles, whereas,
for example, the XVIII Corps area was 250 miles deep and a hundred wide. The
ambulance units operated with similar equipment and therefore experienced
great difficulty in working efficiently with regulators or hospitals. As a result,
they often took patients only to hospitals whose locations they knew, and those
hospitals were not always the ones best able to assist the wounded. Air ambulances also had difficulty learning where casualties awaited. One helicopter company, in the words of the General Accounting Office (as the Government
Accountability Office was then known), “listened to the international disaster
channel to find out where casualties were. . . . After patients were loaded, pilots
flew directly to known hospital locations over Iraqi tanks and infantry. One pilot
stated that if it had been a ‘shooting war,’ the company would have lost every
10
Huey [helicopter] and its crew.”
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To overcome these shortcomings of communications equipment, VII and
XVIII Corps restricted air ambulances to shuttle runs between designated collection points near the battlefield and drop-off points adjacent to hospitals. As a
Navy medical officer with a Marine Corps tank battalion described his situation,
“The locations of higher echelon medical facilities were not even available at the
11
battalion or division level.”
Communications between medical units and between the different levels of
care (such as between aeromedical evacuation units and field hospitals) were
made even more difficult by the prevailing variety of radio equipment and the
use of commercial along with tactical telephone systems. Without adequate
communications capability, some Army and Air Force facilities frequently had
no warning of the quantity or type of casualties that they were to receive. Some
field hospitals did not know that casualties were on the way until the
aeromedical evacuation helicopter arrived. Obviously, for them, planning for
12
patient-care needs was out of the question.
During the movement into Iraq, some Army hospitals were left for several
days with no method of communicating with either combat or evacuation units.
The chief nurse of the Army 12th Evacuation Hospital found its communications in Saudi Arabia nonexistent; the equipment was too diverse and too limited in capability. Helicopters had FM radios with a range of only twenty miles;
the field hospitals had AM radios, which in any case could not be used near a
battlefield, since their transmissions were traceable by the enemy. Furthermore,
while combat and command units had satellite equipment, that did not put
them in direct communication with the medical units that lacked such capabilities. Also, due to either traffic saturation or inherent equipment limitations,
none of the systems at aeromedical evacuation locations proved consistently
13
reliable.
Communications problems for combat and support units, of course, are not
new. They were identified during the URGENT FURY invasion of Grenada in
1983, during the 1990 JUST CAUSE contingency in Panama, and during such
Joint Staff exercises as PROUD EAGLE (worldwide), REFORGER (Europe), and TEAM
14
SPIRIT (Korea).
Casualty Regulation Breakdown
Communications problems among all services during DESERT SHIELD and STORM
degraded the casualty-regulating mission. These were primarily related to limitations and mismatched capabilities on both the intra- and inter-service levels.
Some medical facilities could not communicate with their control elements, with
one another, with supported combat units, or with supporting logistical units.
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The inability of medical regulators to manage the evacuation of patients
could have led, had the projected numbers of casualties actually occurred, to the
underuse of some hospitals and the overwhelming of others—a potentially
tragic situation. A “lessons learned” report by the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command stated that as a result of communications problems, 43 percent of patients
arrived at the wrong airfield and had to be rerouted to the appropriate medical
facility.
While automated medical regulating systems existed, they were unfortunately not standardized, interoperable, or available in all theaters, and they
could not track the location and status of individual patients. Each service had
its own computer systems, and the incompatibility of those systems severely
15
limited the ability of medical organizations to interoperate during the war.
Casualty Evacuation Problems
The process of medical evacuation entails moving patients under medical supervision both to and between medical treatment facilities. The Army and Marine Corps provide most of the ground and helicopter lift for tactical medical
evacuation. (The primary Air Force medical mission is to provide fixed-wing
aeromedical evacuation within and between theaters.)
In the Persian Gulf conflict, problems arose in the effective use of both
ground ambulances and helicopters in tactical evacuation of patients. Ground
ambulances could not be used as often as had been planned because of the rugged terrain, a lack of navigational equipment, and the long distances. Even air
evacuation was taxed by the distances from pickup points to the hospitals; refueling was frequently required, and crews had trouble locating fuel sites. Some
air ambulances landed near tanker trucks, tanks, and Bradley fighting vehicles to
16
ask for fuel and for directions to the nearest proper supply.
Lacking its own tactical medical evacuation assets, the Navy ordinarily relies
upon returning (“retrograde”) combat support aircraft with primary missions
other than medical. They serve as “transportation of opportunity” for moving
casualties to medical facilities afloat and to land-based advanced-echelon medical facilities. Obviously, because of other priority commitments, such aircraft
are not always available in sufficient numbers when urgent medical evacuation
requirements arise. In the Gulf in 1990–91, short-range Army and Marine helicopters were available for medical evacuation, but, as Army and Marine Corps
officers acknowledged, too few of them—at least in part, as asserted by the Defense Department’s inspector general, because Navy aeromedical requirements
had not been previously made known and the Army and Marine Corps had accordingly not arranged to support them. As noted by the Navy’s surgeon general,
“lack of dedicated tactical aeromedical evacuation capability in naval services
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would have created difficulties had the theater (Southwest Asia) matured as ex17
pected.”
To have had any fewer or less capable Air Force aeromedical evacuation assets
would have affected patient care as well. The commanding officer of the Air
Force’s theater aeromedical evacuation squadron later stated that insufficient
aircraft were allocated to evacuating patients and that the predicted flow of casualties would have overwhelmed them. Further, even given sufficient aircraft,
there were shortages of crews and in-flight evacuation equipment; the Air Force
surgeon general was convinced that “we were fortunate that the medical evacuation system was not taxed.” If it had been, substantial shortfalls in strategic and
tactical aeromedical evacuation would have materialized.18
Nobody should have been surprised. Like communications problems, deficiencies in aeromedical evacuation assets are nothing new. They were noted in
several Joint Staff–sponsored exercises, including REFORGER in 1987 and WINTEX
in 1988 and 1989. During the latter, in Europe, a lack of dedicated aeromedical
evacuation assets paralyzed the entire combat zone until three thousand exercise
19
casualties could be removed.
The Air Force, particularly aware before the 1990 Iraqi invasion that it did not
possess sufficient personnel or equipment to manage patients needing individualized care during evacuation flights out of Southwest Asia, required that any
hospital unit evacuating a patient needing constant attention was to provide an
in-flight medical attendant and enough specialized equipment, such as respirators or cardiac monitors, to last five days. Two Navy fleet hospitals were required
to provide for additional care at staging sites. These requirements, however, were
not taken into account in fleet hospital and hospital ship manpower and equipment authorizations. Had casualty rates approached predicted levels, the inventory of ventilators, intravenous fluids, medications, litters, and a host of other
20
items would have been rapidly exhausted by these evacuation needs.
In a 1993 report the Defense Department inspector general indicated that operation plans of the commanders in chief still, two years after DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM, did not promote the efficient use or sharing of medical assets. It indicated that the U.S. Central, European, and Pacific commands did not
propose to integrate medical support at all, instead assigning each service component to provide for its own forces only. The report found further that such inconsistencies persisted because of poor testing of medical systems during joint
exercises—exercises that included only token medical participation and could
21
not validate readiness.
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OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM
Anecdotal reports from surgical staffs, as well as from tactical aeromedical nurs22
ing staffs, do not, unfortunately, offer much hope for the future. Once again,
they related discouraging examples of the state of medical regulation: inadequate coordination/communications between the extraction site and the flight
controllers at the Direct Air Support Center–Patient Evacuation Team, as well as
between the inbound casualty evacuation aircraft and casualty delivery sites.
Invasion Maneuver Phase
The surgical teams related not only difficulty in communicating with evacuation controllers but also that they received no warning of incoming casualties.
Likewise, occasional long waits at casualty evacuation pickup points were observed, as well as insufficiencies of personnel or equipment at casualty-drop-off
landing zones. The limited communications and limited available airlift likewise
made reinforcement or replacement of medical personnel difficult.
Concurrently, training deficiencies of medical personnel were reflected in the
relaying of incorrect landing zone coordinates and erroneous patient priority
status, as well as in frequent failure to report to controllers updates in the physical status of casualties prior to pickup. In addition, during the invasion of Baghdad, inexperience and lack of training led to “over-triage” of casualties by
frontline medical responders. On the medical evacuation messages, all casualties had been designated as “urgent surgical,” some inappropriately, leading the
flight controllers to direct all casualties to the forward colocated surgical teams,
nearly overwhelming their capability. One forward-located surgical team was
obligated to care for seventy-eight significantly injured casualties in a
forty-hour period, performing surgery upon fourteen in twenty-four hours. Indeed, the combination of communications deficits, lack of available resupply,
insufficient return of nurses who had accompanied evacuation flights of casualties, and physical exhaustion all significantly degraded their capability. As noted
at the time by one of the authors, “Only because of an unplanned fifteen hour
break, return of the en route care nurses, and serendipitous arrival of supply
blocks with commonly used medical consumables, were the teams able to meet
another 30 hour period of sustained casualty flow.”23
Transfer of clinical data, including health and treatment status of casualties,
from one treatment point to another was not easily accomplished either; charts
were sometimes lost or illegible when received at higher levels of care. Attempts
were made to convey information by writing on the skin or dressings, but in
vain; the notes were often smudged, soaked, or illegible. Nurses assigned to provide en route care attempted to pass on information vital to ongoing care, but
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time was often limited. (Incomplete information transfer can lead to repeated,
and possibly unnecessary, operations. For example, one combat support hospital backing up the surgical teams re-operated upon every casualty as a matter of
policy, mistrusting even the information it had. Another such hospital used a
policy of selective re-operation, depending on the information available, the status of the patient, and the perceived experience level of the forward surgeons
who had first treated the casualties.) In addition, the forward surgical treatment
units, lacking feedback on the outcomes of their interventions, could not know
if their practices needed to be changed.
An additional issue consistently seen at this time was that of conflicting perspectives between tactical commanders and medical commanders on the geographic placement of forward medical assets.
Security and Stabilization Phase
During redeployment of Navy medical assets in IRAQI FREEDOM II,* the location
of surgical assets was again often determined by ground combat commanders,
who based their decisions upon evacuation times, attempting to ensure that every
Marine was within one hour of an operating table, if needed. This once resulted
in placement of a Navy FRSS team within twelve minutes’ evacuation time of an
established advanced Army combat support hospital, thereby creating redundancy and wasting limited valuable resources that were needed elsewhere, such
as during the initial operations in Fallujah.
In May 2004, the Army surgeon general received from his trauma consultant
a report regarding theater trauma care that confirmed many of the above obser24
vations. The consultant noted, first, disorganized delivery of trauma care on
the battlefield, resulting in nonoptimal staffing and placement of surgical assets,
and casualties occasionally being sent to the wrong location. Second, he found,
medical records were not reliably reaching the next level with casualties, with a
resultant impact upon clinical care and ability to capture aggregate experience.
Finally, he recommended the establishment of a “Joint Theater Trauma System.” A fully functional joint combat trauma system would embrace all aspects
of trauma management, from prevention, training, and evaluation through all
phases of care with command and control, as well as data collection, evaluation,
research, and process improvement. It would also involve dedicated communications and ensure adequate standards and oversight of first-responder care at
the point of injury, initial resuscitative care at the battalion aid station, forward
surgery, en route care, definitive care either in the theater or aboard MPF(F)s or
ships of the expeditionary strike group, and finally strategic transport care
* Corresponding in U.S. Marine Corps usage to the service in Iraq of I Marine Expeditionary Force
from March 2004 to March 2005, conducting “Phase 4” (security and stabilization) operations.
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beyond the combat zone. The system would be under the oversight of a “corps
trauma surgeon,” an experienced trauma physician who would:

• Negotiate with ground commanders regarding the optimal locations of
facilities with surgical capability

• Minimize delays at forward locations and analyze time intervals between
different levels of care

• Ensure continuous improvement of casualty care at forward levels, on the
basis of data accounting for the great variability of care, outcomes, skills,
and circumstances

• Optimize evacuation routes
• Ensure consistent policy regarding en-route interventions by aeromedical
nursing staffs

• Ensure reliable communications
• Reduce geographic redundancy between medical units of various services
with similar capabilities

• Ensure effective communications and logistical support.
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS FOR SEA-BASE COMMANDERS
Recent advances in development of body armor and changing tactical utilization of improvised explosive devices by opposing forces may well have shifted
the spectrum of wound survivability. The incidence of mortal wounds of the
chest and abdomen may have diminished, thereby allowing greater numbers of
casualties with severe injuries to the head, brain, and neck, as well as major
blood vessel injuries of the extremities, to survive long enough to reach forward
combat unit medical staffs, such as those of battalion aid stations. Granted, the
resuscitation capabilities of battalion medical personnel on the ground, both
corpsmen and physicians, are projected to grow. Nonetheless, will the treatment
system envisioned under sea basing’s concept of a minimal medical footprint
ashore allow timely and competent treatment of these severe injuries?
In 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, a surgical hospital erected by the Israeli
Defense Force in the Sinai Desert received casualties in groups of from thirty-six
to 140 (on one day 440 casualties), stabilizing them and transferring most to
25
hospitals in central Israel. Would not such a volume in a future major conflict
quickly overwhelm a limited number of Navy/Marine forward resuscitation and
surgical units or equivalent if they were available in combat service support areas?
FRSS units each have only two surgeons, one surgical theater, a small number of
nursing personnel, and no appreciable patient-holding capacity. In a sea-base
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scenario accompanied by a large number of ground combat casualties, would
not their inability to sort out types and levels of injuries rapidly, directing personnel needing advanced care to appropriate facilities and returning those with
minimal injuries to their units, result in a mass, hurried, and necessarily indiscriminate transfer of casualties to an offshore medical facility, the sea base itself?
Failure to identify the most needy casualties for evacuation imposes enormous burdens upon transportation assets and afloat facilities. Military planners
unfamiliar with the realities of combat wound management often consider
medical evacuation but an exercise in logistics, in which numbers of anticipated
casualties, quantifiable capacities of transport facilities, availability times of
transport shuttles, and numbers of available beds are the primary considerations. That view ignores the realities of wound care and implies an acceptance
of an overall increase in deaths, or at least disability, and a decrease in the return
of men to duty (see photo).
How can patients evacuated
from a battlefield to a sea-based
medical entity be properly routed
to the facility best suited to their
specific needs? Absent a well practiced and smoothly functioning
casualty-distribution system, supported by advanced and networked communications, the
growing proportion of surviving
casualties with severe wounds are
likely to find themselves not in
the seaborne medical facility best
prepared to treat their specific injuries but in the less capable faciliCasualties being evacuated by CH-46, IRAQI FREEDOM
ties of amphibious assault ships.
U.S. Navy
Ideally, a sea base would include
MPF(F) ships with modules capable of advanced neurosurgery to manage brain and spinal cord damage and of
vascular surgery to treat complicated blood-vessel injuries. Clearly, time expended transferring patients with such devastating injuries, without knowledge
of their specific needs, from a battalion aid station to a marginally staffed facility
aboard an LHD could be fatal, or at least sharply lessen prospects for recovery, and
consume limited resources unnecessarily (see figure).
Are the necessary medical-regulation capabilities regularly practiced during
exercises? In 1994 one of the coauthors was the deputy amphibious task force
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss3/5
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surgeon in a major Pacific exercise, TANDEM THRUST, and in 1997 served as the
deputy naval forces surgeon in a combined U.S./Australian TANDEM THRUST off
the Australian coast. In neither exercise was medical regulation practiced. In
fact, actual injured personnel from the afloat task force were flown ashore to a civilian hospital. A report generated by international colleagues who had held
medical leadership positions in a later exercise, RIMPAC 2000, noted a similar
lack of medical regulation “play.” Ironically, the report held that the most useful
medical communications method in RIMPAC 2000 was unclassified e-mail,
26
which worked throughout the exercise.
A COMMAND MEDICAL ELEMENT
The historical record of dysfunctional medical support during armed conflict
reflects persistent neglect of the fundamentals of managing the needs of the sick
and wounded. In the setting of joint/combined sea-based operations, dissociated from a land base, therefore, serious consideration should be given to a command entity specifically responsible for operational control over joint medical
functions. Such responsibility must be vested in a single entity or individual who
is appropriately placed within the command structure, is assigned adequate staff
to discharge these responsibilities, and has clearly delineated authority and accountability. Likewise, there must be a clear and functional chain of command
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within this entity that can develop as well as execute joint medical plans involving the sea base.
This “medical command element” would promulgate local doctrine sufficient to guide not only joint medical planning but also that of each service in the
joint task force. Consequently, authority must be delegated by the chain of command to the command medical element to ensure that these principles are incorporated into operational medical planning at every echelon and that the
plans developed by service components are both coherent and compatible.
The medical command element would also:

• Ensure that the sea-base medical system can integrate with the joint
strategic patient evacuation system in wartime as well as during
contingencies.

• Ensure that responsibility for control of the tactical and strategic
components of the medical evacuation system lies within the same chain of
command and that clear guidelines regarding aircraft destinations and
patient distributions, as well as priorities for medical evacuation, are
promulgated.

• Ensure that the system of medical communications at the joint level, as well
as within the various components of the sea base, are sufficient to support
wartime medical operations, are simple and direct, and will work reliably
during times of crisis.

• Determine whether the sea base can accept biological, chemical, or
radiological warfare casualties.

• Ensure that adequate mechanisms exist in the medical planning system for
assessing the capabilities of friendly nations to provide hospitalization and
evacuation support in the event of mass casualties, and also for arranging
that support via adequate means of swift communication channels.
Without a well developed medical support plan and methodical testing of its
worthiness, the Navy and allied services may not be aware of all the possible impediments to the rapid surge and timely engagement of their forces in response
to crises within a sea-base context. A comprehensive set of goals, performance
measures, time lines, milestones, benchmarks, and guidance documents are necessary to manage any joint medical response plan effectively and to determine if
the plan is capable of achieving its goals. In any case, systematic testing and evaluation in the field of new concepts is an established practice for gaining insight
as to how systems and capabilities will perform in actual operations. Commitment to the implementation of these most basic fundamentals of medical support in the field must be firmly established. It is to answer this call that a medical
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command-and-control entity is proposed. The medical people who are now
practicing “good medicine in bad places” are far better prepared than ever before. Now, they need to be given a command structure and proper resources to
do their job even better.
Will it work? We must not forget that military innovation and improvements
are fostered by developing new concepts and organizational ideas, transferring
them into operational reality, and employing them. Table-top and commandpost exercises, war games, and experiments have traditionally been applied to
these purposes, exploring military doctrine, operational concepts, and organizational arrangements. The concept of a deployable medical command element
is surely worthy of similar consideration.
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